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Notes
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-RIGHTS OF HEIRS OF EACH SPOUSE
TO ACQUISITION BY WIFE IN A PURPORTED PURCHASE OF SEPARATE
PROPERTY-A wife was designated vendee in a conveyance of real
estate from her father, and her husband joined her in a recital
in the acceptance affidavit that the purchase was "to be separate
and paraphernal property." When she died, leaving neither as-
cendants nor descendants, her surviving husband was recognized
as her sole heir. Upon his death the property descended to the
present defendants, who are his children by a prior marriage. The
wife's heirs, her brothers, sisters, nephew and nieces, bring this
action, alleging that the property was part of her separate estate
to which they are entitled. Held: (1) that the defendants, being
forced heirs of the husband, are not bound by his estoppel, and
plaintiffs have not succeeded in rebutting the presumption that
the property was part of the community; and (2) that plaintiffs
may not adduce parol evidence to show that the purported sale
was actually a disguised donation. Drewett v. Carnahan, 183 So.
103 (La. App. 1938).1
The doctrine of estoppel when the husband has joined his
wife in a recital that property bought in her name is to be part of
her separate estate has a long history in Louisiana jurisprudence.
The husband himself is clearly estopped; 2 similarly the husband's
devisees, legatees, and "simple heirs" are debarred, since they
stand in his shoes and cannot claim as his that which he declared
or admitted was another's.3 It is equally well settled that cred-
itors of the husband are not estopped.4 Difficulty arose in deter-
mining the rights of forced heirs, and prior to 1876 there were
conflicting lines of authority on such rights.5 In that year Kerwin
v. Hibernia Ins. Co. made its first appearance before the supreme
1. A.number of other problems are presented in this decision, but the
present discussion Is limited to the points indicated.
2. Maguire v. Maguire, 40 La. Ann. 579, 4 So. 492 (1888); Succession of
Bellande, 42 La. Ann. 241, 7 So. 535 (1890).
3. Kerwin v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 35 La. Ann. 33 (1883); Drumm v. Klein-
man, 31 La. Ann. 124 (1879); Brown v. Stroud, 34 La. Ann. 374 (1882).
4. Gogreve v. Dehon, 41 La. Ann. 244, 6 So. 31 (1889).
5. On the one hand there is the policy of protecting titles and of pre-
venting attacks by children on the acts of their parents. Boone & Cockerham
v. Carroll, 35 La. Ann. 251, 284 (1883). And on the other, the policy of pro-
tecting the rights of forced heirs and preventing any change in the rights of
succession or in the character of separate and community property. Kerwin
v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 28 La. Ann. 312, 315 (1876).
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court, which said that "the heirs of the husband are not estopped
from questioning it [the transaction] as they might be if the
acknowledgment was in favor of any one other than his wife."6
A different rule was adopted, however, when the Kerwin case
made its third appearance before the court, in 1883; the rule laid
down in the earlier decision was termed "obiter" and specifically
repudiated 7, and the right of attack granted to forced heirs was
limited to the protection of their l6gitime. Thus if the heir had
already secured his forced portion, he had no action.' In the
following year the legislature amended Article 2239 of the Civil
Code9, extending to forced heirs all the rights of creditors to
attack simulated sales, and specifically adding that the attack by
such heirs is not limited to their l6gitime.10
In the instant case, the heirs of the husband are relieved of
the burden of proof by the presumption that anything acquired
by either spouse during the marriage is community property,
despite contrary recital in the acceptance affidavit.1 The same
presumption exists in favor of the husband's creditors in the
analogous situation. 2 It is then incumbent upon the party alleg-
ing the separate character of the property to establish "(1) The
paraphernality of the funds; (2) the administration thereof sepa-
rately and apart from her husband; and (3) investment by her.""
The plaintiffs in the instant case failed to carry this burden.
The present court's decision on this point is amply justified
by prior cases,'" but the policy of this jurisprudence is question-
able. If the property was actually a donation to the wife from
her father, disguised as a sale to prevent its being kept out of
commerce during his lifetime, 15 the inequity is obvious: A father
6. Kerwin v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 28 La. Ann. 312, 314-315 (1876).
7. Kerwin v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 35 La. Ann. 33, 36 (1883).
8. Westmore v. Harz, 111 La. 305, 35 So. 578 (1904).
9. La. Act 5 of 1884, amending and re-enacting Art. 2239, La. Civil Code
of 1870.
10. Westmore v. Harz, 111 La. 305, 35 So. 578 (1904); Bauman v. Penny-
well, 164 La. 888, 114 So. 723 (1927).
11. Arts. 2402, 2405, La. Civil Code of 1870. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237,
148 So. 37 (1933). Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana
(1931) 84, 138-139 (also found in (1929) 4 Tulane L. Rev. 27, 40).
12. Gogreve v. Dehon, 41 La. Ann. 244, 6 So. 31 (1889).
13. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 244, 148 So. 37, 39 (1933).
14. Particularly Westmore v. Harz, 111 La. 305, 35 So. 578 (1904); and
Gogreve v. Dehon, 41 La. Ann. 244, 6 So. 31 (1889).
15. The dangers of purchasing donated property during the lifetime of
the donor, aptly illustrated in Guidry v. Caire, 181 La. 895, 160 So. 622 (1935),
render it extremely difficult to secure a purchaser, or a lender willing to
accept such property in mortgage. Cf. Kirby v. Kirby, 176 La. 1037, 147 So.
70 (1933).
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makes a disguised, but not fraudulent, inter vivos gift to his
married daughter and takes the precaution to have her husband
join in the acceptance affidavit and recital that the property is
to be a part of the wife's separate estate. The intent of the donor,
of the donee, and of the husband is manifest; yet after the death
of the principal parties the precautions are ineffective against
the husband's forced heirs. Even though the latter are strangers
to the successions of donor and donee alike, the property is vested
in them by a presumption of law which can be rebutted by the
heirs of the donee only through the satisfactory discharge of an
almost impossible burden of proof.
The amendment to Article 2239 has been considered largely
declaratory of the existing jurisprudence, except that the heirs
are no longer confined to their l6gitime.16 This extension imposes
a severe penalty on any ancestor who may wish to transfer his
disposable portion by what is actually a donation inter vivos,
concealed as a sale in order that the subject of the donation may
not be kept out of commerce during his remaining years.1 7 His
own forced heirs may always attack a direct simulated sale and
return the entire property to the succession. 18 The ancestor thus
has no option, but must make his inter vivos disposal in the form
of a donation and as a specific extra portion; and consequently
the property cannot safely be sold or hypothecated until the
donor's death. Under the doctrine propounded in the final deci-
sion of the Kerwin case 9 the rights of forced heirs to their l6gi-
time were adequately protected, yet the ancestor's freedom of
disposition beyond that portion was unimpaired. The legislative
change therefore seems undesirable.
Article 2239, as amended, seems to contemplate an active
attack by the heirs who allege the simulation and who therefore
have the burden of proving it. It is doubtful whether the legisla-
ture considered the undesirable consequences which would result
when this right was combined with the general presumption of
community property. The power of attack by parol evidence
clearly does not extend to situations in which the ancestor bought
16. Eberle v. Eberle, 161 La. 313, 319, 108 So. 549, 551 (1926).
17. See note 15, supra.
18. He can protect title in his donee-heir by buying in the donee's name
from a third person, but even then the other forced heirs can require colla-
tion of the purchase price under Article 1248; and he cannot protect the
property itself from the forced heirs of the donee's husband, if the donee
be a married woman.
19. 35 La. Ann. 33 (1883).
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property in the name of a third party, because his heir may not
by such means show title in him when it does not appear that
the property ever "belonged to his ancestor by some title recog-
nized by law. '20 However, because of the presumption that all
purchases during the marriage are community property,2 the
heirs of the community do not fall under this ban when they
allege that the community was actual vendee of property pur-
chased in the name of the wife.2 2 When the ancestor actually
supplied the price, there can be no quarrel with the result at-
tained. Indeed, the right of attack might well be extended to
include such simulations, whoever the named vendee may be, in
order to close an obvious loophole by which creditors and forced
heirs may be defrauded of their rights. 28 But relieving the heirs
of the burden of proof invokes inequitable results when the wife
is actually beneficiary of a disguised donation from anyone other
than her husband.
The inequity suggested in the instant case might have been
avoided if the plaintiffs had attacked the simulated sale by their
father to their sister, to have the transaction set aside and the
property revert to their father's estate.24 Since the vendee
in the simulated sale was one of the vendor's children, the situa-
tion falls squarely under Article 2444;"1 and actions by forced
heirs under this article seem never to have been limited to the
l6gitime. 26 The plaintiffs here, however, sued as legal heirs of
their sister, claiming under her, and since they are not her forced
heirs, they have no right under either Article 2239 or Article 2444.
They first attempted to claim the property as their sister's by
virtue of a valid sale, and when the presumption of community
property combined with the lack of an estoppel against the de-
20. Eberle v. Eberle, 161 La. 313, 108 So. 549 (1926), following Barbin v.
Gaspard, 15 La. Ann. 539 (1860).
21. Article 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870.
22. The same applies to creditors of the community. Gogreve v. Dehon,
41 La. Ann. 244, 6 So. 31 (1889).
23. The rights of third parties, who have bought in good faith through
reliance on the public records, being protected as in other attacks under Article
2239 (as amended). Cf. Weydert v. Anderson, 157 La. 577, 102 So. 676 (1925).
24. Succession of Bauman, 167 La. 293, 119 So. 54 (1928). Cf. the language
of the court In Dupuy v. Dupont, 11 La. Ann. 226, 228 (1856): "The District
Judge decreed that the sale should be set aside, and the property declared
to belong to the succession of Antoine Dupuy. It would have been more
formal to have declared the sale a disguised donation to the daughter, and
decreed that she should collate the property in a partition to be made here-
after among the heirs of Dupuy."
25. Article 2444, La. Civil Code of 1870.
26. Dupuy v. Dupont, 11 La. Ann. 226 (1856).
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fendants to confound that contention, they attempted to show
by parol evidence that the transaction was actually a dis-
guised donation. The refusal of the court of appeal to admit such
evidence is justified by the case of Whittington v. Heirs of Pe-
gues,2 7 in which plaintiffs, holding title by purchase from Mrs.
Pegues to property which she had secured from her mother in a
purported sale, were denied the right to show by parol evidence,
in defense of an attack by the children of the vendor, that the
former sale was actually a disguised donation.28 The Whittington
case, in turn, is based on Loranger v. Citizens' National Bank.29
The ruling is justified in the Loranger case because it was a pur-
ported sale from husband to wife, which is prohibited under the
laws of Louisiana; but the broad rule against parol evidence
therein laid down was carried over to the Whittington case,
where (as in Drewett v. Carnahan) it was used against those
whom it was intended to protect-the parties who would profit
by absolute maintenance of the written contract.
The fact that the plaintiffs in the principal case could have
availed themselves of an alternative attack does not mean that
all such injustices can be so solved. This solution is obviously
possible only when the donee's heirs are also forced heirs of the
donor. Thus if a wife's uncle makes a disguised donation in her
favor, her heirs have no recourse when the property is treated
as community property and seized by the forced heirs of her hus-
band-unless they are permitted the right, specifically denied them
under Whittington v. Heirs of Pegues, to show by parol evidence
that the purported sale was actually a donation and thus a part
of the wife's separate estate.8 0 Therefore, it seems advisable that
the donee's heirs should be given that right; that the forced heirs'
attack be limited to the l6gitime, except where the policy of
equality among forced heirs is involved;3 1 and that this right be
27. 165 La. 151, 115 So. 441 (1928).
28. After the decision was handed down the plaintiffs accepted uncondi-
tionally the estate of their mother, warrantor of the title. Therefore the case
was remanded on rehearing.
29. 162 La. 1054, 111 So. 418 (1927).
30. Article 2334, La. Civil Code of 1870. Even heirs of the donee who are
forced heirs of the donor may suffer under this rule when the donor has pur-
chased from a third person in the name of the donee. Their only recourse
is to secure collation of the purchase price, although the property may have
enhanced greatly in value, as by discovery of oil. See note 18, supra. In
many instances the gift of money cannot be established, though the circum-
stances of the sale could be, so the heirs cannot force the collation. Cf.
Eberle v. Eberle, 161 La. 313, 108 So. 549 (1926).
31. This could be effected by the repeal of La. Act 5 of 1884 and the re-
establishment of the jurisprudence of Kerwin v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 35 La.
19381
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extended to permit attack on the property itself in those situa-
tions wherein the ancestor accomplishes his simulation by buying
from a third party in the name of his donee (the rights of subse-
quent purchasers always being protected). Such sweeping
changes could not be accomplished without action of the legisla-
ture, but their need is indicated by the possible injustices re-
vealed in Drewett v. Carnahan. C. OQ.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-FIXING OF MINIMUM
PRICES IN BARBERING BUSINESS-Act 48 of 1936 grants the Board
of Barber Examiners' the power to fix in each Judicial District
the minimum prices which may be charged by the barbers of that
district. The official prices are to be ascertained from price agree-
ments submitted to the Board by a group of at least three-fourths
of the barbers in each district. The purpose of the act is declared
in section I to be to "protect the public welfare, public health and
public safety." The orders of the Board are given the force and
effect of law and their violation is made a criminal offense. The
defendant Parker charged less than the minimum price set for
his district and his license was suspended for six months by
order of the Board. He disregarded this order. Thereupon, suit
was instituted to enjoin him from conducting his barbershop.2
The defendant contended that Act 48 of 1936 violates the due
process clauses of both the Federal and the State Constitutions.
Held, on rehearing, with two justices dissenting, that Act 48 of
1936 is a proper exercise of the police power of the state. Board
of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 182 So. 485 (La. 1938).
It is a truism of constitutional law that the police power of
the state enables it, with certain limitations,8 to regulate private
business in order to protect the public health, safety, morals and
general welfare.' And it was early held by the United States
Ann. 33 (1883). The equality among forced heirs is protected by Art. 2444,
La. Civil Code of 1870.
1. The Board of Barber Examiners was created by Act 247 of 1928, § 20,
as amended by Act 126 of 1932, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 9386].
2. A criminal proceeding, State of Louisiana v. Guchereau, 182 So. 515
(La. 1938), having substantially the same facts, was consolidated with this
action on the rehearing and the cases were argued together.
3. Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62, 11 S.Ct. 855, 35 L.Ed. 638 (1891); Bailey v.
People, 190 Ill. 28, 60 N.E. 98 (1901); People v. Murphy, 195 N.Y. 126, 88 N.E.
17 (1909); State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (1911).
4. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873); Chicago B. & Q.
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